I always thought of Whitey Herzog as a happy, almost carefree guy.  Now that I’ve finished his book, You’re Missin’ a Great Game, I realize  that he is good natured, but he is also desperately in love with baseball, and righteously distressed about the way it is heading.  In that sense, we are alike.

The thing that seems to bother him  most is the schedule.   Scheduling Interleague games creates a strength of opposition problem, which he believes is unfair.  It is, and I said the same thing when I was managing.  We had to play our in-state “rivals,” the Rangers in a series at home and in Arlington, while the Cardinals did the same thing, playing the Royals.

At that time, the Rangers were a much better team than the Royals and we were in close competition with the Redbirds for a division championship or a Wild Card berth.  Shortly after I made my complaint, I was put on notice not to say it again.  MLB is adamantly against any kind of criticism.  They want everyone to do everything exactly the way they prescribe it with no exceptions, no complaints.

Actually the strength of schedule problem didn’t bother me much.  I viewed it as a minor issue because of the length of the season.  During the course of the year, you catch some teams when they’re hot, some when they’re cold.  You play them when they have several stars on the DL and when they are perfectly healthy.  And you have no control over that.  In that sense, the Rangers or Royals issue didn’t seem that important.

What is important, going forward, is the balance of the schedule now that there will be 15 teams in each league in 2013.  That is an awkward number.  I’m not sure how the schedule will look with Interleague games being played throughout the season.  My guess is that it will prevent head-to-head matchups among division contenders in September.  Those matchups are the essence of the pennant race.  We lost them for a few years at the beginning of Interleague Play and it was so obvious that MLB returned to an unbalanced schedule so that teams within a division would play each other down the stretch.  I don’t know if that will be possible in 2013.

Another thing that bothered Whitey and bugged me too was the last expansion.  It was clear to a professional observer that the talent was already diluted and further expansion would only make it worse.  I know that if you can expand, you can also contract; I also know will never happen.  If you could go back to 28 teams, it would help with the dilution problem.  But the scheduling would still be ungainly.   To get to a number of teams that could provide a really good schedule, you’d have to go back to 24.  Or you’d have to expand to 32.

This is where Whitey blew my mind.  He actually supported the 32-team scenario, and he wrote about it thirteen years ago! In his mind, the sanctity of the schedule is more important than the paucity of Major League-caliber ballplayers.  And I’m not sure I disagree with him.

The problem is that there aren’t enough cities to support MLB now.  I think you could move the Rays to San Antonio and improve the current set-up.  But when you look at the smaller cities that can support football and basketball, you won’t find any that can draw enough fans for 81 baseball games, not to mention compete with teams in big cities for local TV revenue.  Then there is the geographic problem.  There aren’t enough big cities in the western states.  In baseball, you play every day.  And you just can’t keeping hopping back and forth from coast to coast without serious jet-lag.

The only reason Whitey grudgingly recommended 32 teams is that he’s been around a lot longer than the current owners and has seen how we got into this mess to begin with.  He traces it all the way back to the designated hitter.  In the early seventies, baseball attendance, especially in the American League, was losing ground while the NFL was ascending.  Pitching was dominant back then, so the A.L. owners decided to “experiment” with a DH to add more offense to the game.  It worked, but there was an unintended consequence.  The DH was almost always a high-priced player.  With the inroads Marvin Miller was making for the players in the area of free agency and arbitration, salaries were climbing even without the DH.  The owners would need to create new revenue.  Whitey could see it coming.

From that point, 35 years ago, just about every change in baseball was a result of the owners trying to enhance revenue.  The way he describes it is that they shoot first and aim later, and then try to figure out how to clean up the mess.  Each time revenue-enhancing changes brought problems, they shot again without aiming.

Expanding to 32 teams would at least allow for a balanced schedule.  The consequent dilution of talent problem would likely solve itself over time.  Further expansion would create more cities that can’t compete financially.  But from my perspective, which goes almost as far back as Whitey’s, that would still improve the big picture going forward.  And the owners might like because it would create more immediate revenue.  Anything you change at this point will require further adjustments.  But if you get the schedule issue solved, at least you would be aiming before you shoot.   And at least you wouldn’t shoot yourself in the foot — again.

Whitey Herzog was a great manager and he has the championship rings to prove it.  One thing was obvious to me when I saw him on the field at Busch Stadium.  He had it all together.  His players generally  seemed happy and his coaches, though professional, were loose and friendly, like the Rat.  They were easy to talk to.

I’m reading his book, “You’re Missin’ a Great Game” now, and I wish I had his personality when I was a skipper.  He had the players in the palm of his hand, even when they disagreed with him.  There was a lot of laughter and almost no stress in the Cardinals clubhouse.

But in the area of his greatest strength, there was a false assumption.  They were the Runnin’ Redbirds, but when it came to the hit and run play, he often had them running for the wrong reason — to avoid the double play.

Years ago, Bill James published an abstract each year.  One of the categories he analyzed was how many ground ball double plays each pitcher induced.  The best at that time was Tommy John who got one twin killing in just under every five opportunities.  Nolan Ryan, by contrast, got only one for every twenty chances.  The average among all big league pitchers in the year I studied was one in ten.

Knowing this had an influence on how I managed.  I seldom employed the strategy because it made no statistical sense.  Still, I would have used it more often if I had been able to sell my idea to my runners.  My idea was to abandon the conventional thinking about the play.  For their entire baseball lives, they had been taught that the runner’s job was to take a conservative lead and run after the pitcher threw the pitch.  In other words, get a lousy jump.  They had also been instructed that, as hitters, they had to swing and make contact no matter where the pitch was thrown.  If a hitter was lucky, he would get a pitch he could hit on the ground where the shortstop or second baseman had vacated his position to cover second.

I didn’t want to force my power hitters to swing at pitches they couldn’t hit hard, which is one of the reasons I didn’t use the play.  But I may have used it occasionlly in if I could be sure the runners would try to get a good jump.  Let’s say we had Craig Biggio on first with one out and Jeff Bagwell at the plate with Greg Maddux on the mound.  In this situation Bagwell was much more likely to hit  a double play grounder than a home run.   Bagwell had a lot of power, but Maddux was able to take it away from him with his sinking pitches.  I would have hit and run in that situation with Biggio or Bill Spiers on first base.  But I was a poor salesman.  I tried to get our runners to get a good jump on the play instead of playing it safe.  They thought I was crazy.  “What does he know?  He was a pitcher.”  I could almost hear them say.

Oddly enough, people thought we were a hitting and running team because we often ran on pitches the hitter swung at.  We were stealing, not employing the hit and run.  But to the observer, it look like the same thing.  My instructions to the hitters was to swing at any pitch you can hit hard whether the runner is stealing or not.  My strategy, because I was a pitcher, was to run a lot.  It puts pressure on the pitcher and it takes an infielder out of his normal position.  Preventing a double play   was a secondary consideration.

Still, even my coaches didn’t buy into it.  They didn’t mind the hitters swinging at pitches they could drive, even if the runner had a good jump and would probably be safe.  We had a lot of power hitters and everybody wanted them to go for the extra base hit.  We were in the middle of the Steroid Era and playing for one run before the eighth inning was a fool’s errand.

The hit and run strategy came from the Dead Ball Era when playing for one run made sense.  There were very few home runs back then and hitters seldom struck out.  Many pitchers posted ERAs below 2.00.  Putting the ball in play was easier than it is now.  And you had to win a lot of games by scratching out one run.

But old habits die hard.  One day I asked all my coaches if the hit and run was an offensive or defensive strategy.  Every one of them said the same thing as Whitey.  Against ground ball pitchers, you have to try to prevent the double play — a play that is at best a one in five chance.

Here’s the rub.  If the runner has a good jump and the batter hits a ground ball, the runner is almost always safe at second.  So, you end up giving up an out to get a man on second.  But, if the runner gets a bad jump and the ball is hit hard, the defensive team turns the double play anyway.  Whitey’s presumption is that the runner will get there in time to break up the double play.  But even if he does, you give up an out and the runner is still on first.

So, what’s the risk of trying to get a good jump?  “Don’t get picked off on the hit and run”  is what players have always been told.  But how how often do base stealers get picked off?  James does not have a stat for that event, but anyone who watches a lot of games knows that it seldom happens.  So, in effect, there is very little risk.  But if it happens to you when the hit and run is on, it’s an unforgivable blunder.  I told our guys, “Don’t worry about getting picked off.  If you do, it’s my fault.”

They took that advise like a rebellious teenager listens to the admonition from his parents to be careful when they hand him the keys to the car.  I couldn’t sell my ideas like Whitey.  Fact is, I probably couldn’t sell my hit and run ideas to him.

It may seem like every sector of the economy is in free fall, but oh so quietly, Major League Baseball is thriving.  The Rangers and Astros have recently been sold.  The former went for almost 600 million, and the latter for just over 600 million.  Nolan Ryan and Jim Crane weren’t born yesterday.  They had to be almost certain that the revenue would cover the debt service.  In other words, there’s a lot of money flowing through the system and a lot of it is yours,whether you know it or not.

For as long as I can remember, baseball has been fervently trying to reach the 18-25 year old demographic.  Almost accidentally, they finally succeeded by going on line.  MLB.com has been a cash cow and, unlike local TV and radio, it benefits all clubs equally.  This is why you haven’t heard any agonizing compaints from small market teams lately.  And it is why a new Basic Agreement was signed yesterday with barely a hint of acrimony.  No, the Rays can’t spend money like the Yankees and Red Sox.  But they can stay in business.

Several things got my attention when the new deal was announced last week.  First, there were more shackles put on amateur free agents.  With strict limits on amateur bonuses, agent Scott Boros has threatened to steer his young clients toward football and basketball.  I’m sure most GMs would say good riddance.

Personally, I think it’s a good idea to limit the amount the teams can play for untested ballplayers.  Many of them, including a lot of first round picks, will never make it to the big leagues.  And, the ones that do will not win any popularity contests.  The journeyman ballplayers, who signed for a pittance and worked for low pay for many years riding buses in the minor leagues, are generally, and justifiably irritated when the #1 pick in the June draft drives into town in a Mercedes to be showcased in front of the big league staff.

Now, you have to make it to the big leagues to dine in the club car of the Money Train.  The minimum salary for major league players is now nearly half a million dollars, and established stars will benefit too.  Because the number of Type A free agents has been reduced, there won’t be as many players who qualify for compensatory draft picks.   So, the rich players will get richer and the rest will benefit from trickle down largesse.  This is how it should be.  Prove it first; then get paid!

I know many, if not most fans think the multi million dollar players are overpaid.  But that’s built into the system and Ryan and Crane knew it when they bought their teams.  How much does Justin Bieber make anyway?

These issues are important, but they are page two stories.  The headlines proclaim “HGH Testing Part of Labor Deal.”  If you read into the story, you find that this testing is limited to this spring and the next off season.  In-season testing will be studied but not implemented this year.  Although the player’s union has steadfastly opposed drug testing, it is hard to take that stance from a PR standpoint.  My guess is that with a foot in the door on blood tests, the tests will eventually be used during the season too in coming years.

This should be a relief to any player who is not hoping to set a new home run record, which means all of them.  I can imagine the anguish many players experienced when they took their first dose of steroids.  It would have bothered me, but I probably would have taken the medicine.  Sure, many players took the plunge gladly.  But there had to be a lot of guys who felt compelled to take the juice out of self defense.  Now, it’s likely, the playing field will be level — at least until they come up with a drug that can’t be detected or a better masking agent.

The amazing thing to me is that it’s been 21 years since the players and owners have gone to war.  Before that, every renewal of the Basic Agreement was attended by a work stoppage, and bad blood among all parties, including fans.  So, now we are free to play ball for at least five years.  By that time, Ryan and Crane will know for sure whether a big league team in Texas is worth 600 million dollars.

At this point, losing Clint Barmes doesn’t seem like such a big deal.  And in the grand scheme of things, it’s not.  But it could mean something next year, beyond saving money for the future and giving the kids a chance.  It could mean that the Astros enter 2012 without any veteran presence except for Carlos Lee.

“So what,” you say.  “They’re not going to contend for the playoffs anyway.”  And you’re right.

But finding a steady shortstop is hard to do.  When I was managing, the position was filled by Tim Bogar and Ricky Gutierrez.  They were both good with the glove, but neither was a run producer.  It worked for us because we had a load of big bats, and our pitchers didn’t have to look over their shoulders every time a ground ball was hit to short.

The Astros have signed a number of potential replacements this fall, some of them with limited time at SS in the big leagues.  The also have Angel Sanchez, who has played short adequately, but with limited range in each of the last two years.  He’s a pretty good contact hitter, but has no power and seldom walks.  If he stays healthy, he could fill the gap between 2012 and say 2014.  By then, he’ll have a veteran presence — probably not the kind of presence a team wants.

Barmes is already the kind a team does want.  I wish him well with the Pirates and, if he plays like he did in the second half of last year, he will be a bargain at 10 million for two years.  He handled the situation with class, going out of his way to mention that he was happy in Houston.  He knows he doesn’t fit into the rebuilding plans here.  He is a professional ballplayer.  And that’s something the Astros may miss next year.

I’ve been through rebuilding efforts several times with the Astros and I don’t recall them ever going into a season with so few veteran players that the young guys can go to for council.  They really don’t need any veterans to rebuild the team physically.  But it may have been useful to spend a little money and keep Barmes just for the abstract notion of “team pride.”

That’s easy for me to say because it’s not my money.  And I certainly wouldn’t want to spend a dime on a big time free agent at this juncture.   But, as a pitcher or a manager, I wouldn’t want to go into a season with the shortstop position so unsettled.  The Astros have one more option that has not been mentioned in anything I’ve read.  And that is Tommy Manzella.  Manzella can play the kind of shortstop that gives pitcher’s comfort.  He was the starting SS in 2010 and he didn’t hit a lick.  He played short at AAA last year and still didn’t hit.  He probably never will.  But the Orioles of old had a shortstop named Mark Belanger who never hit for 18 years!  He was a veteran presence on many championship teams.

Two other positions are so important that you can overlook hitting — catcher and centerfield.   Jason Castro got hurt last year and it was the worst break the team had all year.  Not only did he miss a full season of learning to hit a the highest level. but more importantly, he missed a year of catching young pitchers that he will likely be catching for years to come.  He didn’t need the extra reps behind the plate.  He’s already ahead of the curve in the physical aspects of the job.  He reminds me of Brad Ausmus in that way and could become a better hitter.

Centerfield is another story.  One of the feel good stories of the 2010 season was the emergence of Jason Beorgeois.  He can play center, but he’s no spring chicken.  They also have Jordan Shafer, a left handed hitter who came over in the Michael Bourn trade from the Braves.  Neither of them can replace Bourn, on or off the field.  Fact is, the Astros not only lost their four best players, Bourn, Hunter Pence, Lance Berkman and Roy Oswalt in the last two years.  Every one of them was a winner in every way.

It’s hard to sustain the loss of talent;  losing the men that define you as a team is a tough loss too.  Barmes was that type of guy.  If the young guys make progress, Castro settles in, and the pitching holds up, the Barmes loss will be inconsequential.  By the time the Astros can contend, he will probably be a backup shortstop anyway.  But the Astros still have to play 162 games next year and the year after that.  They need someone to “step up” as they say.  And I’m not sure who that’s going to be.